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JOHNSON’S DIFFERENTIATION THEORY – IS IT REALLY 
EMPIRICALLY SUPPORTED?1 
 
The feminist paradigm of domestic violence - which views it as a form of male 
domination of women - has been widely accepted among career domestic violence professionals 
(Mahoney, 1991; Dobash & Dobash, 1979; Pence, E.).  However, it has never been fully 
accepted by others who do not specialize in the field, including family court personnel, some 
researchers, and other critics.   The countervailing paradigm - sometimes dubbed the “family 
violence” paradigm - treats domestic violence as a mutual and circumstantial problem, often 
suggesting that women are as violent as - or more violent than - men. (Straus, MenWeb Online 
Journal; Dragiewicz, 2008).  Despite warring exchanges in both journals and courtrooms 
(Dutton, 2006; Straus, 2009; Rosen, Dragiewicz & Gibbs, 2009)), neither side has ever 
succeeded in changing the other’s opinion.   
Michael Johnson’s theory offers a solution to the pitched battle – by arguing that both 
camps are right (Johnson, 1995).  A thoughtful sociologist with feminist credibility and 
identification, (Johnson, www.personal.psu.edu/mpg/MPG/Welcome.html), including a history 
of working with domestic violence shelters/programs, Johnson’s differentiation theory has 
rapidly and remarkably gained traction among both feminist and non-feminist scholars and 
practitioners (Stark, 2009; Jaffe et al, 2008; Frederick, 2008; Ver Steegh and Dalton, 2008; 
Salem, 2007) 
Johnson argues that the (feminist) paradigm of domestic violence as male domination and 
the (non-feminist) paradigm of mutual or female-initiated violence are both distinct parts of 
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reality.  Like the blind men feeling the elephant, he argues, each opposing camp feels a different 
part and insists it defines the whole animal.  According to Johnson, each group is studying 
different populations, which manifest different types of domestic violence.  Drawing upon pre-
existing research studies, he argues that violence driven by males’ need for power and control is 
seen predominantly among populations urgently seeking shelter or legal assistance (on whom 
domestic violence advocates and scholars focus), while the anti-feminists are capturing in 
anonymous telephone surveys a more widespread kind of family violence which does not stem 
from male domination but rather from relationship conflict, and which is perpetrated by women 
as much or more than by men.  Johnson’s oft-repeated conclusion is that domestic violence can 
no longer be spoken of as a unitary phenomenon:  because it can take such different forms, it 
must always be characterized as one type or another (Johnson, 2008). 
 The idea that there might be different types of violence between intimates is not novel 
(Pence & Das DasGupta, 2006; Holzworth-Munroe & Meehan, 2005; Straus, 2009).  However, 
Johnson’s theory, which purports to be empirically based and emanates from a self-identified 
“feminist,” has, unlike prior theories, met with remarkably rapid and widespread adoption, 
especially in courts. “Differentiation” has rapidly become the new mantra in family law practice 
and many proposed reforms (Jaffe et al, 2008; Salem, 2007; Ver Steegh and Dalton, 2008).  
Among its strongest adherents are custody evaluators, who find his category “situational couple 
violence” useful in explaining why minor violence may be of little concern.   
At least three factors help explain the remarkably quick integration of Johnson’s theory 
into court practices:  (i) his claim to empirical proof of his typology; (Johnson, 2008, 19, 
invoking “the evidence”); (ii) his suggestion that the two warring camps can be reconciled in a 
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manner which enticingly offers an end to the gender wars; and most troublingly; and (iii) the 
usefulness of his validation of a “situational couple violence,” which he describes similarly to the 
non-feminist “family violence” paradigm (described above), to family courts.  Johnson’s 
validation of the non-feminist, mutual, and situational violence paradigm – accompanied by his 
assertion that this type constitutes the vast majority of domestic violence – is especially 
appealing to family courts which frequently hear domestic violence allegations, but usually do 
not see them as raising serious concern for custody/visitation  (E.J. v. D.J., 2011; C.A. v. J.B.  
2011; In re Morrison & Zacharia, 2009; Stephanie F. v. George C., 2012).  Notably, despite the 
typology’s growing use to legitimize minimization of domestic violence in family courts - other 
than this author’s work,i only a single brief feminist critique has been published   (Zorza, 2011).  
This article begins to fill that gap, with particular focus on Johnson’s claim to empirical 
“proof.”  Careful review of the research on which he relies suggests that, contrary to Johnson’s 
assertion, the data he relies on does not support his typology, especially his claim that coercively 
controlling abuse is rare.  Moreover, aspects of the research, and the typology itself, contradict 
other elements of the typology.  I conclude that, although the differentiation approach warrants 
continued research and development, it is not yet ready for “prime time” in the courts – and in 
family courts, it is affirmatively destructive.   
Overview of the Theory  
Johnson’s theory emanates from a potentially brilliant resolution of the gender wars over the 
feminist paradigm of domestic violence.  Johnson theorizes that the two embattled views are 
merely an artifact of the fact that different professional groups study different populations. i.e., a 
product of “selection bias.”  He states that domestic violence advocates and researchers are 
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focused on victims seeking services, such as shelter or legal protection, and these victims are 
more afraid, more endangered, and more likely to be female victims of male violence aimed at 
power and domination.  Hence, these researchers, lawyers, and advocates developed the power 
and control paradigm based on their experiences with such victims.   
In contrast, he argues, “family violence” researchers such as Murray Straus, who do not work 
with clients, but rather, study survey populations through anonymous phone surveys, are tapping 
into a completely different population.  These findings that men and women appear to be at least 
equally violent to each other, or that women are more violent reflect a different population, 
which is experiencing “common couple violence.”  Relatively few “male domination” cases are 
found in surveys, Johnson argues, because women in such relationships are too at risk to be able 
safely to participate in a survey.  Conversely, men and women involved in mutually violent or 
non-oppressive violent relationships were likely to be less fearful and less at risk, and therefore 
less likely to seek services such as shelter or legal protection.  
To capture these two different paradigms of domestic violence, Johnson coined two 
categories: “Common Couple Violence” (CCV; later termed “Situational Couple Violence” 
(SCV)) and “Patriarchal Terrorism” (later termed “Intimate Terrorism” (IT)). The first type is 
“violence that is not connected to a general pattern of control involving specific arguments that 
escalate to violence” (Johnson and Leone, 2005). The second type is “the attempt to dominate 
one’s partner and to exert general control over the relationship, domination that is manifested in 
the use of a wide range of power and control tactics, including violence” (Johnson and Leone, 
2005).  Johnson emphasized that Intimate Terrorism is what feminist writers and advocates have 
meant by “domestic violence.”  According to Johnson, it is committed “almost entirely” by men 
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against women, and is linked to patriarchal attitudes (Johnson, 2008, p. 2).  Johnson also asserts 
that SCV is far more common than IT  (Johnson, 2008, 2). 
How do the two types of domestic violence differ in impact?  Johnson has described 
CCV/SCV as less severe, less frequent, and less likely to escalate (Johnson, 2008, 23), though he 
has also acknowledged that it can be serious (Johnson, 2008, 62) and even homicidal (Johnson 
2008, 33 n. 32).  He believes intimate terrorism to be “ the type most likely to be frequent and 
brutal” and to escalate (Johnson, 2008, 23, 25).  According to Johnson, IT victims have more 
injuries, pain, health impact, post traumatic stress disorder, and loss of work than SCV victims  
(Johnson and Leone, 2005).  In an important caveat, Johnson also states that severity and 
frequency do not exclusively define each type, although the types do differ “on average” 
(Johnson and Leone, 2005).  Rather, he emphasizes that the defining distinction between types is 
the presence or absence of the motive to keep control over the partner – not the severity of the 
violence.   
  Johnson’s four types thus break down as follows: Situational Couple Violence (roughly 
equal distribution across genders, sometimes but not always mutual violence); Intimate 
Terrorism (mostly men); Violent Resistance (mostly women); Mutual Violent Control (both 
parties) ii.  His bottom line is that it is no longer scientifically or ethically acceptable to speak of 
domestic violence without specifying, loudly and clearly, the type of violence to which we refer 
(Johnson, 2005).  
Differentiation’s Value 
Johnson’s enterprise of distinguishing between violence used to enforce a regime of terror 
and control and violence which is expressive or conflict-driven but does not instill ongoing fear, 
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is a valuable addition to the field.   There should be no question that some violence between 
couples is not part of a larger control dynamic; some is simply a function of conflict run amok; 
and some may reflect mental illness or other disorders.  From a feminist perspective, recognition 
that some violence between intimate partners exists which does not fit the gender-oppressive 
paradigm of “battering” helps to distinguish women’s use of violence from the “true abuse” 
(usually male vs. female) typically understood to be meant by the term “domestic violence.”   
Moreover, the intimate terrorism paradigm’s defining characteristic of power and control 
helpfully underlines the feminist argument that control-type abuse is a means of men’s 
subordination of women  (Pence and Dasgupta, 2006; Bancroft, Silverman, & Ritchie, 2012; 
Mahoney, 1991).  Insofar as the law, which focuses solely on discrete incidents of violence and 
not on how it is used or the control dynamic within which it may be embedded, has not reflected 
the power and control paradigm (Stark, 2006; Tuerkheimer, 2004), Johnson’s emphasis on the 
power and control lends support to the feminist argument.   
Johnson’s depiction of the power and control at the heart of battering (which he calls 
“intimate terrorism”) “joins a line of analysis” which has been amplified for decades by prior 
feminist researchers (Stark, 2006, p. 1021).  However, none of his predecessors have drawn on a 
broad empirical basis synthesizing data across major studies, as Johnson purports to do, nor 
provided, as Johnson does, a resolution to the feminist domestic violence and “family violence” 
researchers’ standoff regarding what domestic violence really is.   Both Johnson’s theory of 
selection bias and his typology are elegant and intuitively appealing, and they likely capture at 
least portions of the truth.  
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Differentiation’s Damage  
Johnson’s call for recognition that some domestic violence is better labeled “situational 
couple violence,” while widely adopted with little critique, raises significant concerns among 
many working with battered women – particularly in custody litigation.  Family courts have been 
increasingly recognized as very dangerous territory for adult and child abuse victims (Hannah 
and Goldstein, 2009; Jaffe, Crooks and Poisson, 2003; Neustein & Lesher, 2005; Stark, 2009; 
Lemon, Jaffe & Poisson, 2003; Meier, 2003).  In these circumstances, a theory that can 
contribute to custody courts’ minimization of the implications of abuse or domestic violence is 
necessarily of concern.   
By asserting that SCV is far more common than IT and is generally less severe, 
Johnson’s typology intrinsically validates the old view that most violence between partners is not 
gendered, is mutual, or simply a function of conflict rather than dominance or oppression.  Most 
importantly, this view presumes that most domestic violence allegations are not terribly 
concerning.  The following cases are only a few examples of cases found in published opinions 
indicating that the “situational” moniker is indeed being used to justify ignoring or minimizing of 
domestic violence in the custody context.  Based on reports from advocates in the field, it is 
likely that this use of the label - to minimize domestic violence - is quite widespread. 
Case 1 
In this case, the court initially found that Mr. J had committed two legally cognizable 
assaults against his wife, including an instance of shaking and throwing her on a bed, and an 
instance of wrapping a dishcloth around the back of her neck during an argument and pulling her 
toward him.  The court rejected Ms. J’s testimony that he actually crossed the dishtowel in front 
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of her neck and began to choke her.  Nonetheless, the court minimized its own findings of 
domestic violence, based in large part on a custody evaluator’s opinion that the violence Ms. J 
had experienced was merely “situational couple violence” (E.J. v D.J., Appellant’s Brief, 2011, 
n. 26).  Based on this label, the evaluators and judge concluded that there were no concerns for 
the well-being of the children, that the older girl’s fear when with her father and her refusal to 
see or talk to him, were entirely unfounded, best explained as a product of her mother’s 
“excessive” fear and hostility toward her ex-husband.iii  The situational couple violence label was 
a convenient way for both the evaluators and court to neutralize the court’s own findings that the 
father had twice committed physical abuse, and, importantly, to shed the protective statutory 
mandate triggered by those findings (E.J. v D.J., 2011).   
Thus, this court awarded joint custody and a number of other conditions, which were 
inappropriate in light of the history of violence (e.g., parenting mediation with a parenting 
coordinator).  The mother continued to raise concerns about the children when parented by the 
father, and refused to treat the father as a harmless and decent parent.  As a result, both children 
were ultimately removed entirely from their mother (who had never committed any abuse) and 
awarded to their father (an adjudicated perpetrator), and the older one was forbidden to see her at 
all, as a purported cure for her so-called alienation (Meier, 2009). 
Published Decisions 
Similarly, Maine’s Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s award of unsupervised 
visitation to a father who the mother had accused of a history of domestic violence.  The 
appellate court quotes the Guardian Ad Litem’s opinion in the following section: 
[T]he guardian concluded that the episodes of domestic violence were attributable to ‘‘situational 
couple violence’ arising from conflicts in the marriage, as opposed to ‘coercive controlling 
9 
 
 
 
violence,‘ which is characterized by power and control and often results in serious injuries. . . 
This is not a typical domestic violence situation, in that the person with the power and control in 
the relationship was clearly [mother]… ‘’(Malenko v. Handrahan, 1272).    
 
In C.A. v. J.B., the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that there was  
no [pattern] of violence in either home.  Much has been made of the battery case flowing from 
the parties break up, but under the Court’s understanding of current domestic violence analysis, 
this appears to be an incident of Situational Couple Violence or more likely Separation Instigated 
Violence rather than the Coercive Controlling Violence which would give the court great 
concern.  Under this analysis, this factor only slightly favors the mother (C.A. v. J.B., 2011, 5-6).   
The appellate court went on to reject the mother’s spirited arguments that her two past ex parte 
orders against the father, in addition to the father’s criminal conviction for battery, as well as the 
lack of expert support for the trial court’s labels rendered its use of the SCV label an abuse of 
discretion  (Id.).  In a California case, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to allow 
a mother to relocate with her child and description of the father’s conceded pushing of her during 
an altercation as “merely” situational couple violence, despite a prior history that led to a 
restraining order  (In re Morrison & Zacharia, 2009).  Furthermore, at least one appellate court 
has endorsed a trial judge’s finding that the “situational” label for domestic violence was 
sufficient to rebut a statutory presumption against joint custody to a perpetrator of “domestic 
violence”  (Stephanie F. v. George C, 2012).  
 In most of these cases, the mothers had sought or received protective legal measures, 
including protective orders, arrest, and/or criminal convictions.  In Johnson’s typology, that help-
seeking is indicative of “intimate terrorism” and not situational couple violence – or at most, 
serious enough violence to stimulate fear and legal action.  Nonetheless, each of these courts 
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minimized the domestic violence history as merely “situational,” and therefore not subject to 
existing statutory restrictions based on domestic violence.  While it may be unfair to lay these 
arguably inappropriate applications of Johnson’s typology at his doorstep, to many domestic 
violencelawyers, precisely this use of his types was predictable, particularly given his assertion 
that SCV – and not controlling abuse - is the “norm.” 
While in none of these cases did the “situational” label alone cause the troubling judicial 
outcome (including, in E.J. v. D.J., complete loss of custody from a non-offending and 
concededly fit mother), in each case it reinforced and facilitated the use of other theories and 
analyses, including parental alienation, which minimized the significance of a father’s past 
violence to the mother, and arguably, even to the child.ii  Had the SCV label not been available, 
the courts would have been less able to write off the domestic violence as irrelevant to custody.  
Instead, the “situational” label allowed them to essentially ignore the history of abuse, to treat it 
as “violence with a small v,” (E.J. v D.J. Appellant’s Brief, 44), and on that basis, to ignore the 
statutory constraint intended for “domestic violence.” It should be noted that at least one of these 
cases (E.J. v. D.J.) occurred within a court known for its commitment to domestic violence 
through a dedicated Domestic Violence Unit, and which has advanced a number of once-
progressive reforms (Epstein, 1999) 
These cases reflect the trend in family court toward rapid and broad adoption of Johnson’s 
(and similar) categorizations (Kelly and Johnson, 2008; Jaffe, Johnston, Crooks & Bala, 2008; 
Ver Steegh & Dalton, 2008). The assimilation of the SCV paradigm in family courts is furthered 
especially by Johnson’s repeated assertions that it is situational couple violence which is the 
norm, and intimate terrorism which is rare  (Johnson, 2008, 11; Johnson & Leone, 2005). This 
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assertion, again playing into many peoples’ intuitive minimizations of the breadth and 
seriousness of abusive violence, has reinforced widespread assumptions that those who litigate 
custody are not that different from most of us, and therefore allegations of abuse there need not 
be presumed serious  (Zibell, 2005; Ver Steegh, 2005). In fact, a growing number of forensic 
evaluators have asserted that the majority of the cases they see involve only situational violence, 
and not “power and control” violenceiii   (Stark, 2009, 307; Saunders et al, 2011, 6).  This view is 
predictable, because the SCV concept converges easily with other widespread but scientifically 
dubious theories like parental alienation, which similarly treat abuse allegations as either 
insignificant or affirmative evidence of a pathological or vengeful mother’s malevolent drive to 
exclude the father from the children’s lives  (Jaffe, Johnston, Crooks & Bala, 2008; Meier, 
2009). 
 In Johnson’s defense, neither his publications nor the research upon which he relies 
explicitly claims that the differing types of domestic violence necessarily correlate to differing 
risks to children after separation.  Thus, it could be argued that the theory was never intended to 
apply to custody and visitation decisions.  However, while Johnson certainly does not appear to 
have given much thought to the implications of his theory for custody battles, he does 
problematically imply that custody litigants may be similar to the phone survey respondents, i.e., 
more like a random sample of the population, rather than that relatively small slice of the 
population which he believes comprises couples involved in IT   (Johnson, 2008, 81-82).   
Moreover, the following comment indicates Johnson is entirely unfamiliar with the realities 
facing women who battle abusers for custody:  “If a woman has been so psychologically abused 
that she believes her partner really can get the courts to give him custody of the children if she 
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leaves him, how can she in good conscience abandon them to him?” (emphasis added) (Johnson, 
2008, 54).   Perhaps if he were acquainted with the disastrous outcomes facing thousands of 
abused women and children in family courts, (see pp. --- above), he would have thought 
differently or more carefully about his typology.  
Empirical Critique 
If Johnson’s typology were verifiably correct and relevant to outcomes for children, this 
critique would aim solely at custody courts’ misapplications of it, and not at the theory itself.  
But in fact, not only does the theory lack attention to the implications for custody litigation, its 
empirical underpinnings are actually quite debatable, and his most significant empirical 
conclusion in itself contributes to the problems in family courts.  It is the theory itself, therefore, 
at which I aim this critique.   
What makes Johnson’s SCV concept so powerful in the hands of custody professionals who 
are skeptical about abuse is Johnson’s prevalence claim:  If it is true that SCV is the primary 
paradigm in the population, it is a small leap to the assumption that it is also likely the norm 
among custody litigants.  This assumption – that custody litigants are not much different from 
the general population – and hence that their domestic violence likely mirrors the situational 
couple violence Johnson asserts is most common, validates family courts’ assumptions that most 
of the abuse claims before them are over-dramatized illegitimate claims about conduct which 
should not determine a parent’s right to custody.  If, however, Johnson’s numerical assertions are 
incorrect, and coercively controlling violence is actually more widespread than situational 
violence, then the conventional wisdom in family court – that most domestic violence is not 
serious – would be powerfully challenged. 
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Johnson himself touts the theory’s empirical foundations.  In his definitive book, he states 
that his “argument” was first published in 1995 and “seemed reasonable enough,” but only 
subsequently could he offer “the evidence” (Johnson, 2008, 19). The evidence to which he refers 
consists of multiple different data sets and studies by others, which he asserts demonstrate both 
that the different types are real and that they can be quantified.  
But this “evidence” is far less determinative than he suggests.  This is important not only 
because it reduces the scientific proof that his typology is accurate, but more importantly, 
because it dismantles his repeated assertion about the relative prevalence of SCV and IT – an 
assertion which is widely believed by courts, to the detriment of survivors of abuse. 
Problems with the Quantitative Analysis 
After theorizing the different types, Johnson opens his empirical discussion thus:  “Here is 
the evidence:” (Johnson, 2008, 19). His “evidence,” however, is flawed in at least two respects.  
First, the research he relies on was not undertaken to focus on control, and hence it tends to 
measure various behaviors which may or may not really reflect relationship control.  Second, his 
own empirical findings in certain respects contradict his types. Third, and most important, his 
prevalence claim is based on a “cluster analysis” of the data which uses an arguably 
inappropriately high threshold to distinguish between “high control” (IT) and “low (or non) 
control” (SCV) cases.  Independent research suggests that a lower threshold may be more apt, 
resulting in a reversal of Johnson’s assertion about prevalence of SCV vs. IT (Frye, Manganello, 
Campbell, Walton-Moss & Wilt, 2006). 
Use of Old Data Sets Not Intended to Measure Control 
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Johnson’s empirical analysis is not based on any original research.  Rather, he reanalyzes 
existing data sets from prior studies, none of which, with one partial exception, were gathered 
with this typology in mind.  His findings are thus limited by the data sets, which (with one 
exception) were not themselves measuring coercive control in any depth.  While he 
acknowledges the limitations of these data, he nonetheless suggests that they “prove” his theory 
is true.  
For instance, Johnson draws on the Effects of Violence on Work and Family Study to identify 
as proxies for control certain behaviors that were measured in that study  (Johnson, 2008, 97). 
Those behaviors included swearing, accusing, and saying things to spite - behaviors which are 
not necessarily “control” behaviors – yet many of the more recognized and fundamental control 
behaviors, such as economic control, isolation, and control of daily life, were not measured.  
Based on these data, which do not capture key controlling behaviors, and using categories which 
appear questionable, Johnson and his colleagues conclude that far more couples fit the SCV type 
than the IT type  (Leone et al, 2004, 485-486).iv    
Are the Categories Really Distinct, and Is SCV Really the Dominant Type?  
Johnson’s strongest evidence for his typology comes from a particular data set:  Irene 
Frieze’s 1970’s Pittsburgh study of three groups of women: (i) women seeking legal protection 
or shelter, (ii) women responding to a flyer for the study, and (iii) a comparison neighborhood 
sample.  This study is valuable for his theory both because it did explicitly measure controlling 
behaviors and because it analyzed both a litigation sample and a neighborhood sample, thus 
drawing on the two differing populations he seeks to differentiate.   Yet, it is this study that 
produces, for Johnson, the most surprising result:  Contrary to his theory, the data indicate that 
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almost half of the couples in the shelter and legal sample qualify (in his terms) as cases of SCV  
(Johnson, 2008, 21). After expressing his surprise at the inconsistency of this finding with his 
hypothesis that most agency samples reflect IT cases, he concluded that it can be explained by 
recognizing that even in SCV cases, some violence is frightening enough for women to seek 
shelter  (Johnson 2008, 21) 
This adjusted position may be correct, but if it is, it indicates a fault line in his theory.  
Indeed, he recognizes the troubling implication for his categories when he writes “where did I go 
wrong?”  (Johnson 2008, 21).  The significant presence of so-called SCV cases in the agency 
sample suggests one of three things:  Either (i) SCV is potentially at least as frightening, 
dangerous, and possibly gendered, as IT (leading women to flee their home and seek shelter), 
contrary to his over-arching theory that SCV is non-gendered, not usually serious, and rare in 
help-seeking samples; (ii) he has mis-characterized as SCV cases those that should have been 
categorized as IT; or (iii) the control factor is not in fact sufficient to differentiate serious and 
one-way abuse from “common couple” violence which is presumably less concerning from both 
a consequential and gender equality perspective.  Any one of these possibilities, which in 
combination are probable, is sufficient to explode the core distinction between IT and SCV:  
suggesting that SCV may be equally or more dangerous than IT and equally gendered with male 
aggressors and frightened female victims  (Anderson, 2009, 1453-1454).  At minimum, this 
“surprising” result suggests that many of the cases Johnson counts as SCV may in fact be IT, 
thereby potentially reversing his prevalence claim, with significant implications for custody in 
particular.     
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A similar problem for Johnson’s typology emerges in his and a colleague’s analysis of the 
National Violence Against Women Survey (NVAWS) data.  The NVAWS data is also quite 
important for Johnson because, like the Pittsburgh study, it is solely based on a telephone survey 
of the general population (thus, presumably capturing SCV), and it also included questions 
related to control  (Johnson & Leone, 2005; Johnson, 2008, 93). But, as with the Pittsburgh data, 
Johnson’s honest and transparent analysis contradicts his expectation:  he finds a “surprisingly 
high representation (35%) of intimate terrorism among the violent men in this sample”  
(Johnson, 2008, 330).  This contrasts with his hypothesis – which he claims to have been proven 
by this very data - that general survey respondents are only very rarely involved in IT  (Johnson, 
2008, 330).  He explains this confounding result by suggesting that the NVAWS is more a 
“crime” survey than a general “families and conflict” survey, which, he suggests, nets more 
respondents describing violence experienced “in a general context of control” than those who 
might have experienced “more isolated” violence  (Johnson, 2008, 330).   
This explanation is unsatisfying, especially given that it directly contradicts his theory’s 
foundational premise – that population surveys will not flush out IT relationships.  Furthermore, 
when placed next to the “confounding” results of the Pittsburgh data analysis, it again suggests 
that Johnson’s idea of clean and distinct types of intimate violence which correlate fairly neatly 
with two different data sources is, at the least, not proven by these quantitative analyses and may 
even be disproven.   Going further, if one takes these results at face value, without speculations 
about who answers which surveys in what ways, this result suggests that intimate terrorism may 
be occurring among at least one third of the general population – in clear contradiction to 
Johnson’s repeated assertion that IT is quite rare.   
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More Mis-Categorizing:  High Cut Points in Cluster Analysis May Reverse Actual Prevalence  
 
As noted above, arguably one of the most significant aspects of Johnson’s theory is his 
assertion, drawn from his analysis of general survey data, that the vast majority of domestic 
violence in the population is SCV, and that IT is relatively rare  (Johnson, 2008, 2). However, 
when one examines the analysis on which he bases this claim, it appears arbitrary at best and 
incorrect at worst.     
Johnson’s “cluster analysis” of the data in each study plots the couples along a scale of 
increasing numbers of control behaviors and then identifies “clusters” of data points.  He then 
draws a line between the primary clusters, treating the cluster which is higher on the scale as the 
“high control” group and the lower cluster as the “low control” group  (Johnson, 2008, 90). He 
then defines the group with the higher number of control behaviors as IT, while denominating 
couples with the lower number of control behaviors as SCV.   
The first problem with this approach is that Johnson does not explain why couples anywhere 
on these scales don’t all qualify as “coercive control” couples, i.e., why even the use of just one 
or two of the control behaviors is not sufficient to create coercive control.  Nowhere does 
Johnson explain why he assumes that a small number of controlling behaviors is not coercive 
control and is merely “situational” violence.  However, he offers a hint when he says “[e]ach of 
the scales discussed above produces a continuum of coercive control that must be dichotomized 
if one is to create the proposed typology” (Johnson, 2008, 90).  It appears that, because he is 
determined to find two distinct types, he must characterize the groups with greater and lesser 
numbers of controlling behaviors as different types. However, this dichotomizing risks 
mistakenly characterizing as SCV even couples where one party uses one control behavior 
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(possibly supplemented by other control behaviors that these arbitrary data sets did not happen to 
measure) along with sufficient violence to generate control of the other partner.  This problem is 
consistent with the point noted above, that his own quantitative analysis of the Work and Family 
study suggests that as many as 1/3 of the couples Johnson is characterizing as SCV have 
indications of IT  (Johnson, 2008, 97).v  The second problem is that in most of the studies, 
Johnson defines high control as three or more behaviors.   Thus, couples with two or fewer types 
of control behaviors are categorized as non-controlling relationships, i.e., SCV.  (Johnson, 2008, 
93, 94, 101; Johnson & Leone, 329).vi    
In at least some of these analyses, Johnson appears to have chosen an inappropriately high 
bar to define “controlling” relationships.  Surely it is reasonable to suggest that couples with 
three or four controlling behaviors qualify as coercive control couples.  The same might also be 
said for two, or even one, controlling behavior – depending on the seriousness of the particular 
control behavior, its context, or its impact.  Indeed, if one compares them to violent relationships 
which lack any of these controlling behaviors, relationships with even one control behavior 
might properly be categorized as “control-based” violent relationships.   It seems likely that if the 
“low control” populations are treated as still within the IT category, the prevalence of coercive 
control relationships and situational couple violence relationships would become reversed:  the 
vast majority would now involve control-based violence. 
This hypothesis is confirmed by a study which was specifically designed to assess Johnson’s 
categories, consisting of original research by a leading empirical researcher.  Jackie Campbell is 
the nation’s leading researcher of femicide and has used empirical research to develop and 
validate her danger assessment tools  (http://dangerassessment.org/AboutCreator.aspx).  
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Campbell and her co-authors’ original research applying Johnson’s categories found 
relationships with one controlling behavior to be 69% of violent couples  (Frye, Manganello, 
Campbell, Walton-Moss & Wilt, 2006). Concerning Johnson’s own higher cut-point of three 
control behaviors, the authors stated:  
The choice of 3 as a cut-point for controlling behaviors for assaulted women seems high. 
. . . [E]ach of the other four controlling behavior items included in our index indicate 
serious attempts to control either the time, contacts or access to financial resources of the 
respondents, and on their face, cannot be conceived of as innocuous relationship 
behaviors… it is the frequency with which tactics are used and how much control is 
achieved, rather than the number of different tactics that makes a difference…. 
 
The authors conclude that SCV may be “the least common” form of domestic violence “at the 
population level,” in direct contradiction to Johnson’s repeated prevalence assertions  (Frye, 
Campbell, Manganello et al, 2006, 1305).  
Theoretical Inconsistencies 
TWhile the focus of this article is on the problems with Johnson’s empirical claims.  a few 
theoretical problems must also be pointed out.  
(i) Different types of abuse or different stages in time?First, it is unknown to what extent 
the types actually describe the same relationships at different stages, rather than in different 
couples.  As a practical (or experiential) matter, it is eminently possible that some degree of 
violence arises in relationships before they become generally controlling, but that over time, the 
violence instills fear, and the perpetrator becomes increasingly controlling.  This hypothesis was 
articulated by the Campbell study authors, who also identified empirical support for it:  In their 
study, the IT couples were older than the SCV couples, which would be expected if SCV couples 
were simply earlier in an abusive relationship trajectory  (Frye, Manganello, Campbell et al, 
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2006).  Of course, if the same couples are appearing in both categories at different stages of their 
relationship, the distinction between types becomes far less salient, because over time they 
become essentially the same, meaning that future dangerousness and other long-term 
implications can no longer be distinguished. Thus it is not at all clear that the implied 
characteristics attached to the SCV label (less dangerous, more mutual, less relevant to child 
custody) apply.   
(ii) Control is unavoidable in one-sided violence 
Second, Johnson’s SCV category was originally named “common couple violence” and 
regardless of label, is intended to capture the kind of physical engagement that one envisions in, 
for instance, sibling fights or barroom brawls.  In other words, it is physical fighting in response 
to conflict, but it is not embedded in a larger intimidating dynamic of power, control, and 
subordination.  Johnson repeatedly emphasizes that SCV can be either mutual or one-sided, so 
long as it is conflict-driven and not part of a larger controlling or oppressive dynamic.  He also 
portrays SCV as, for the most part, more minor, more mutual, and less fear-inducing than 
“intimate terrorism” or control-based violence  (Johnson, 2008, 61-62, 69-70).  But one-sided 
“situational” violence is necessarily intimidating, especially when it is male against female.  If 
one party is the perpetrator and the other the victim, it is hard to imagine there being no power 
dynamic, no fear, and no control.  This is particularly true in light of the reality that, on average, 
women are both less equipped and less able to fight, especially with men, and they suffer far 
greater injuries and other negative consequences from men’s assaults, than the reverse (Swan & 
Snow, 2002, 290; Anderson, 2009, 1449).  “With some exceptions, men generally do not 
perceive women as intimidating or frightening” (Swan & Snow, p. 291-292; Johnson, 2008, 21, 
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62, 70).  More recent research further confirms that the impact of “situational” violence is highly 
gendered, i.e., even in purportedly “situational” violence, women suffer greater physical and 
mental health consequences than men, including with respect to their levels of fear (Sillito, 
2012). 
However if one partner is afraid of the other, some degree of power imbalance and control by 
the violent partner is inevitable.  It is hard to imagine a relationship in which the man is violent 
to the woman (or the reverse), yet takes no advantage of the power or control this affords him in 
the relationship.  Additionally, if non-mutual SCV involves some degree of control, this cuts 
across Johnson’s core distinction between the two types.  This logical analysis converges with 
the quantitative discussion earlier, which indicated that there may be hidden “IT” among the 
populations Johnson characterizes as “SCV.”  
This hypothesis is actually supported by the Pittsburgh data mentioned above, which, as 
previously mentioned, Johnson sees as foundational to his theory.  Johnson expressed “surprise” 
when this data showed that as many as 31-32% of the agency sample – which his theory 
predicted would be IT – actually involved (as he defined it) SCV.  His response is instructive: 
[T]here are considerably more cases of situational couple violence [in the agency data] than I had 
thought there would be.  Where did I go wrong?  I had mistakenly assumed that only intimate 
terrorism would frighten women enough to send them to the courts for a Protection from Abuse 
order, or to a shelter for support or temporary housing.  I hadn’t paid close enough attention to 
my own statements that even situational couple violence can be quite frequent and/or severe.  
And I hadn’t taken seriously enough the evidence from general surveys (thus dealing with 
situational couple violence) that men’s situational couple violence is much more likely than 
women’s to produce injuries.  Shelters and courts are places that women turn to when they fear 
for their safety. . . situational couple violence involving a man assaulting a woman can also be 
severe enough or frequent enough to be quite frightening (Johnson, 2008, 21).   
 
This is undoubtedly true, yet this “recovery” does not go far enough:  As already suggested, 
if women are afraid and seek legal or physical protection from their male partner, it is likely that 
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the partner has derived from their intimidation some illegitimate “power” or “control” over them, 
which is more than the normal give and take in a healthy relationship.  If so, the key defining 
distinction between SCV and IT breaks down. 
There is still another deeper fault line in Johnson’ typology::  Suppose these one-sided and 
gendered “SCV” cases do not in fact involve a coercive controlling agenda.  Must we not then 
acknowledge that control is not the only indicator of serious and gender-oppressive abuse?  That 
is, in any of the cases described above, the perpetrator’s abuse may well have been correctly 
characterized as “situational,” assuming he did not in fact seek to control the mother’s access to 
resources, employment, or freedoms, apart from the child.  However, that did not mean that the 
perpetrator posed no danger to the mother or the child going forward.  Indeed, insofar as most of 
the cases indicated a past history of help-seeking and legal protective interventions, there is good 
reason to believe these women were realistic in asserting future danger.   
(iii) Intimate Terrorism Label Misleadingly Implies Severe Overt Violence 
(3) Not only is Johnson’s definition of situational couple violence potentially inaccurate, his 
definition of intimate terrorism is also likely unduly narrow in a manner which similarly 
misleads courts and evaluators to minimize real danger.  Johnson defines intimate terrorism as 
follows:   
The intimate terrorist uses physical violence in combination with a variety of other control 
tactics to exercise general, coercive control over his partner. . . on average, male intimate 
terrorists are frighteningly violent.(Johnson, 2008, 26, 30).   
 
This definition implies that intimate terrorism is the kind of violence that anyone would 
recognize as seriously dangerous:  The very label “terrorism” inevitably implies lethal and 
disastrous levels of violence, although Johnson hedges at times (Johnson, 2008, 30).vii  In 
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contrast, the label “situational [or “common”] couple violence” intrinsically minimizes the 
severity of any violence and makes it sound mutual. 
Contrary to the IT label’s implication, coercively controlling relationships are often not 
highly violent; in fact, in upper socioeconomic status relationships, the violence is usually 
suppressed but control is often extreme (Stark, 2006, 1021; Waits, 1998; Weitzman, 2000).viii  
For instance, in one of my earliest cases, the wife, an attorney, was under the dominance of her 
husband, also an attorney, down to the most minute details of her day (JML v. CAL, Appellant’s 
Brief, 9).ix  The only physical violence that was evident, however, involved “cornering” her or 
pinning her on the bed and yelling in her face.   Sexual abuse was also present, generally 
involving coercion and force but not overt physical violence. My own experience with such 
cases, as well as the cases and research described above, indicates that extreme violence is the 
exception, not the norm, in these “upscale” marriages, with the possible exception of sexual 
abuse (JML v CAL, Appellant’s Brief at 8; Weitzman, 2000, 18; Waits, 1999, n. 164). 
It must be acknowledged that the lower level of overt physical violence that is prevalent in 
upscale abusive marriages is not the kind of violence that impresses family court judges.  This 
begs the question:  Should extreme coercive control, lacking overt violence, be given significant 
weight in the custody context?  Perhaps – especially insofar as coercive control may be 
indicative of serious future risk.  But as a practical matter, such a relationship is unlikely to be 
seen as amenable to the label “intimate terrorism.” If there is little actual physical violence, the 
label appears incongruous.  Even now, evaluators and judges deem coercive control 
insignificant, especially if the overt violence is minimal.x  In short, “the failure to identify abuse 
is perpetuated by its equation only with severe, unilateral violence” (Stark, 2009, 312).  
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The Ever-Changing Types 
It is possible that Johnson himself recognizes the ambiguities of his types; indeed, he has 
repeatedly revised his categories and their definitions, particularly with respect to dangerousness 
and severity of violence.  For instance, in the first article, he described “common couple 
violence” as involving relatively infrequent and non-escalating minor violence by both genders 
in roughly equal amounts and “patriarchal terrorism” as involving frequent and escalating severe 
one-way violence by men against women (Johnson, 1995, 285 et seq).  Later, he took pains to 
state that SCV is not necessarily mutual, that a substantial portion of it does escalate, and that it 
can be quite severe (Johnson & Leone, 2005, 333; Johnson, 2008, 62, 69). He also acknowledged 
that intimate terrorism can in fact involve only minor and/or infrequent physical violence 
(Johnson, 2008, 29). 
Unfortunately, while Johnson’s writings have become increasingly peppered with 
caveats, the very act of defining types intrinsically requires generalizations.  The more nuanced 
and variable the categories become, the more the types intersect and overlap, undermining the 
very concept of distinct types and inviting mis-applications.  Thus, while there are undoubtedly 
differences in types of violence within different couples and these may have differential impacts 
on children and adults, Johnson’s typology is both empirically and theoretically contradicted and 
subject to doubt.  Given the damage this typology is already contributing to in the family courts, 
going forward, it warrants considerable skepticism until such time as adequate empirical 
foundations and theoretical definitions can be identified. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                          
i See Meier, J., (2015); Meier Presentation, American Association of Law Schools Workshop on 
Family Law, Vancouver, Canada (June 2007); Meier Presentation, Jewish Women 
International’s 4th International Conference on Domestic Abuse, Crystal City, VA (April 2009); 
Meier Keynote, Seminar, University of Akron, Akron Bar Association and Cleveland Bar 
Association (September 2011), http://www.dvleap.org/Resources/TrainingMaterials.aspx (and on 
file with author)   
iiJohnson’s last two types are not discussed further herein.  “Violent Resistance” describes 
women’s violence in reaction to control-based (i.e., IT) violence:  It is sometimes, but not 
always, self-defense, but may also be a violent reaction to a man’s dominating violence.  
“Mutual Violent Control” describes couples in which both parties vie for control with violence.  
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Johnson is, however, uncertain whether this category exists in sufficient numbers to really 
examine  (Johnson and Ferraro, 2000; M. Johnson, 2008, 23-24).   
iiiThe court and evaluators ignored the child’s own report that she no longer wanted to see him 
after he violently shook her in an altercation over a toothbrush, in her first visit to his new home.  
 
 
iv Leone found 51% SCV and 17% IT, along with 32% “control, no threat.”  If the last category 
is combined with IT, the rates of SCV and IT become virtually identical, and given that control is 
the defining characteristic of IT, it is not clear why the authors chose not to characterize the last 
32% as IT.  The label “no threat” is difficult to square with the fact that all of the couples studied 
had experienced violence.  Id. at 486.    
v Johnson also states that the “IT” and “SCV” populations he identified in the Pittsburgh data can 
be understood as those who rate high on all seven control behaviors, vs. those who rate low on 
all seven.  (Johnson, 2008, 97).  However, it seems illogical to call couples with “low” amounts 
of control on all seven control behaviors, “SCV.”  It seems at least as appropriate, if not more so, 
to consider them “low IT.”   
vi Johnson identifies the cut-point for the Pittsburgh data as 2.74, the cut-point for NVAWS as 3 
or more control behaviors, and the cut-point in the Chicago Help-Seeking Study as 5.  “Less 
controlling” couples are called SCV.  In his study with Leone, they used a cut point of two or 
less  (Johnson & Leone, 2005).   
vii In his last publication on the subject (his book), Johnson makes a point of noting that “there is 
considerable variability in the violence involved in intimate terrorism” (Johnson, 2008, 30). 
viii Stark writes “[i]t is unclear whether the violence in coercive control is typically severe as 
Johnson contends or consists of routine, low-level threats and assaults, as I believe.” (Stark, 
2006). 
ix The brief describes Ms. L having had to get permission and to justify to her husband the 
spending of money, grocery shopping, children’’ clothes shopping, and even taking a bath.   
x In the JML case the history of ongoing minor violence and extreme control was ignored.  The 
court then chose not to believe the one very serious incident of choking and sexual assault (JML 
v CAL, Opinion, 2002)  
